TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/032089/03208900.030

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 6.0 KB | 119 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 38

EL SALVADOR

Revolt Under the Coconut Palms


F.M.L.N. rebels prepare for their boldest assault since 1981

By Ricardo Chavira


    El Salvador's Santa Ana volcano juts majestically over a
verdant carpet of coffee bushes, coconut palms and banana
trees, and the occasional clump of peasant shacks. Nine years
of civil war have racked vast portions of the country, but Santa
Ana and the rest of western El Salvador have hardly been
touched.

    Now all that is changing.

    Hidden beneath the foliage, several hundred guerrillas of
the People's Revolutionary Army (E.R.P.), the strongest of five
factions that make up the 10,000-member Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front, have begun battling government forces
for control of the economically vital region. "Cirilo," the
western regional commander of the E.R.P., explains, "Our
interest is to lead the people toward insurrection. They are
already clandestinely organized, and now we are moving to arm
them."

    Cirilo is with a group of some 30 heavily armed fighters
camped on a coffee plantation just seven miles from Santa Ana's
provincial capital, the site of a major army base. In recent
months E.R.P. regulars and dozens of new peasant militias have
attacked military outposts, ambushed patrols, and even briefly
taken a town near the Guatemalan border.

    The guerrillas' bold entry into the region, together with
a sudden surge in F.M.L.N. urban violence, is a graphic
demonstration of what even the Bush Administration privately
acknowledges is the F.M.L.N.'s improved military prowess.
Despite the infusion of $3.4 billion in American aid over the
past eight years, the Salvadoran government is not even close
to winning the civil war. Troops killed most of the guerrilla
leaders in the west eight years ago, forcing the F.M.L.N. out
of the area. The rebels' return underscores their new strength
and the army's inability to vanquish them permanently.

    The F.M.L.N.'s military aggressiveness contrasts sharply
with the peaceful image the rebels have projected in recent
weeks. F.M.L.N. leaders surprised American and Salvadoran
officials in January with a dramatic offer to lay down their
weapons and participate in national elections. In exchange, the
rebels wanted the March presidential vote postponed for six
months. That offer set off a flurry of counterproposals and
talks between the F.M.L.N. and political-party representatives.
State Department officials, who quietly met with a rebel
spokesman to discuss the initiative, were so intrigued that they
encouraged the Salvadoran government to negotiate with the
guerrillas. For a time it seemed as though the rebel plan could
provide a way out of the war.

    But like past attempts to bargain, the F.M.L.N. proposal
fell victim to intransigence and political shortsightedness, as
Salvador's civilian and military leaders squabbled over
whether, how and when to include the guerrillas in the electoral
process. There is little doubt now that the election will be
held as scheduled -- March 19 -- without rebel participation.

    Stung by their diplomatic setback, the guerrillas are
prepared to unleash what even Bush Administration officials
believe will be their boldest military assault since the failed
1981 "final offensive." U.S. intelligence officials say the
F.M.L.N., in preparation for the push, has recruited several
hundred new fighters from among refugees in Honduran camps. The
officials expect the offensive within weeks.

    The guerrillas sound determined to fight unless a newly
elected government proves unexpectedly willing to reopen
negotiations. Warns Cirilo: "We have a genuine desire for peace.
But that should not be mistaken for weakness." Schafik Jorge
Handal, head of the Salvadoran Communist Party and one of the
F.M.L.N.'s top five comandantes, agrees. "If the military says
no to our plan, then that indicates their intention of defeating
us militarily," he says. "That would oblige us to respond, and
the product would be a deepening of the war." Roberto, a veteran
E.R.P. combatant is more direct: "If the elections are held
March 19, our plan is to block them. This is a war to the finish
between us and the oligarchs."

    Far to the east of Santa Ana, in Usulutan province, the
E.R.P. has consolidated its hold on another mountainous
corridor, populated by nearly 200,000 peasants. Three years ago,
the insurgents there were under frequent military attack.
Civilian support was minimal. Today government troops dare only
sporadic attacks, and they are frequently beaten back by peasant
militias fighting alongside regular combatants. "We have
established political control over the area," says "Raul," the
rebel commander, "and now we are moving toward military control
as well." He and other guerrilla leaders have lately obtained
AK-47 assault rifles. They say the guns were bought from the
Nicaraguan contras; U.S. and Salvadoran authorities insist that
the Sandinistas supplied them. "The fact that we have these
weapons is an indication of our development," says Raul.

    Peasant support is crucial to the kind of rural-based war
the F.M.L.N. is fighting. The impoverished farmers of Usulutan,
for example, supply the rebels with food, information and labor.
Says a civilian supporter in Santa Ana: "The moment a soldier
asks you the whereabouts of the guerrillas, and you lie and say
you don't know, from that moment you are collaborating with the
guerrillas. And there are thousands of us like that."

    The coming guerrilla offensive seems likely to prove a
pivotal test of the government's military strength. U.S.
officials doubt that the F.M.L.N. can inflict a major defeat.
But a senior State Department official adds, "However real or
illusory the chances for peace, they are now gone. Now the only
alternative for El Salvador is more war." That is the last thing
battle-weary Salvadorans want.